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Abstract
Theory suggests that endogenous borrowing constraints amplify the
impact of external shocks on the economy. How big is the amplication?
In this paper, we quantitatively investigate this question in the context
of a dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints un-
der two alternatives: (1) borrowing constraint endogenously depends on
the borrowersnet worth (2) borrowing constraint is exogenous. Calibrat-
ing our model to the Japanese economy, we nd evidence of signicant
amplication. Next, we apply our model to Japan and nd that TFP
uctuations can well account for the boom and the bust of the Japanese
economy during 1980 to 2000, and the impact is much more signicant
when borrowing constraint is endogenous.
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1 Introduction
"A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella when the sun is
shining, but wants it back the minute it begins to rain" : Mark
Twain (1835-1910)
In the wake of the Japanese and the East Asian crisis of the nineties, there
has been a resurgence of interest in the link between the asset market and the
aggregate economy and the role played by endogenous borrowing constraints.
The economic experience of Japan and East Asia in the periods just before and
during the nancial crisis is characterized by two distinct facts: (1) a sharp
increase in real estate and asset prices in the years preceding the crisis followed
by a signicant and prolonged decline during the crisis years and (2) a booming
economy just before the crisis characterized by a growth rate exceeding the long
run growth rate of the economy that suddenly gave way to a marked economic
recession. Are these observations linked? Empirical studies have shown that in
Japan and East Asia real estate comprises an important collateral asset so theory
tells us to expect the nancial accelerator mechanism to play a signicant role.
Given the endogeneity of borrowing constraints, external shocks would have
an amplied e¤ect on the economy through uctuations in asset values that
translate to uctuations in a rms ability to borrow which in turn would a¤ect
business investment and output. The question is how big is the amplication?
In this paper we quantitatively test the signicance of the nancial acceler-
ator in neoclassical dynamic general equilibrium model.
We consider two cases: one where borrowing constraint is endogenous and
real estate comprises a part of the collateral asset and the second case is one
where borrowing constraint is exogenously determined and does not depend
on the wealth holding of the borrower. According to the nancial accelerator
theory, the e¤ect of a shock is much more amplied in the former case as com-
pared to the latter. We apply the models to data and quantitatively search for
evidence of such amplication.
The study of the nancial accelerator in macro literature can be traced
back to Irving Fisher (1933)1 who stressed the importance of nancial factors
in the Great Depression. The formal dynamic general equilibrium modelling
of the concept of nancial accelerator began with Ben Bernanke and Mark
Gertler(1989) and has been extended by Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore
(1997) and Charles Carlstrom and Timothy Fuerst (1997). Since then a host
of business cycle researchers have shown the importance of asset price uctu-
ations in the real economy. Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist
1See Matteo Iacoviello (2005) for a discussion of the historical evolution of nancial accel-
erator theories in macroeconomics.
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(1997) studied the role played by nancial accelerator under alternative situa-
tions, including sticky prices and in a monetary model. Glenn Hubbard (1998)
summarizes the empirical evidence gathered from various studies that establish
the sensitivity of business investment to a rms net worth. Matteo Iacoviello
(2005) and Matteo Iacoviello and Raoul Minetti (2006) study the link between
uctuations in house values and the aggregate economy.
The real challenge to the importance of nancial accelerator came with
Narayana Kocherlakotas(2000) study where he questions the quantitative mag-
nitude of amplication and shows that the amplication caused by the nancial
accelerator is particularly sensitive to the factor shares. Our study is motivated
by this challenge. We construct a fully calibrated dynamic general equilibrium
model with variable capital and land, allowing for heterogeneity amongst bor-
rowers in terms of their borrowing constraint. We calibrate our model to the
Japanese case and test for the degree of amplication under alternative borrow-
ing constraints. Next, we study the sensitivity of the magnitude of amplication
to alternative factor shares. Finally, we feed in exogenous uctuations in TFP
to our model and test to what extent our model can quantitatively replicate the
Japanese experience during 1980 to 2000.
Given the economic experiences of Japan in the last two decades of the
twentieth century, Japan looks like an ideal case for testing the nancial ac-
celerator theory . After a decade of boom in the eighties characterized by an
average per capita GDP growth rate of 3.6% and a doubling of real estate
prices between 1985 and 1991, the average growth rate of per capita GDP fell
to .5% in the nineties and real estate prices declined to their pre-1980 level.
This overall economic recession characterizing the nineties in Japan has been
called "the lost decade" by Edward C. Prescott and Fumio Hayashi(2002). Cur-
rently, there are two strands of literature on business cycle uctuations in Japan.
Most studies till date have concentrated on explaining the uctuations in real
economic aggregates. Explanations forwarded include uctuations in nancial
factors including credit market uctuations ( see for example Takeo Hoshi and
Anil Kashyap (2004) or Robert Dekle and Kenneth Kletzer(2003) and Levon
Barseghyan (2006)) and uctuations in total factor productivity (Hayashi and
Prescott (2002). The study that comes closest to ours is by Kenneth Kasa
(1998) who studies the impact of falling asset and land prices on welfare in
Japan, Korea and Hong Kong but he takes the uctuations in real estate prices
as exogenous to the model. Quantitative studies on uctuations in real estate
prices are limited. Sami Alpanda (2006) looks at uctuations in tax on land
as a explanation for uctuations in land prices. Tomoyuki Nakajima (2003)
analyzes the importance of expectations in explaining the uctuations in real
estate prices.
The model we consider is a real business cycle model with heterogenous
agents comprising of workers and entrepreneurs, and a government. The tax
policy is such that the entrepreneurs can claim the interest paid on borrowed
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funds as a deduction from the taxable income for calculation of corporate in-
come tax. Such a tax deduction cannot be claimed for funds collected through
sale of equity hence entrepreneurs have a bias in favor of debt nancing as op-
posed to equity nancing. However, the rms face an endogenous collateral
constraint on borrowings which limits their ability to borrow. We consider a
borrowing constraint of the "margin call" form where entrepreneurs can only
borrow upto a fraction of their wealth where the fraction is commonly referred
to as the loan-to-value ratio. This type of borrowing constraint specication has
gained ground in international macroeconomics literature (see Enrique Mendoza
and Katherine Smith (2006) for a discussion of the "margin call" form). There
are three exogenous shocks that a¤ect the economy at any period: shocks to
productivity, shocks to loan to value ratio and exogenous changes in govern-
ment expenditure. Given our model, any external shock has an amplied and
persistent impact on aggregate output through changes in wealth of an entre-
preneur which a¤ects the maximum amount that an entrepreneur can borrow.
Our model is similar to the credit cycle model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
henceforth referred to as KM. However, there are two important distinctions:
we consider a "margin call" form of the borrowing constraint which is an ex-ante
borrowing constraint as opposed to the ex-post borrowing constraint considered
in KM; more importantly, KM assumes that entrepreneurs are more impatient
than workers which leads to binding borrowing constraints. In our model, the
binding borrowing constraints are a result of a tax policy rather than di¤erences
in discount rate2 .
Calibrating our model to the Japanese economy we nd that the model
with endogenous borrowing constraints result in signicant amplication of TFP
shocks. However, the degree of amplication is sensitive to factor shares as
suggested by Kocherlakota(2000). The rate of amplication decreases as the
share of capital in output goes down.
We next calculate the time series of TFP uctuations from the Japanese
economy. Feeding in the TFP uctuations in our model, we nd that the model
with endogenous borrowing constraints can explain a signicant portion of the
uctuation in output though the performance of the model with respect to
uctuations in land prices fall short when compared to the data.
We also feed in the TFP uctuations in the model with exogenous borrowing
constraints. The results reinforces the fact that the endogeneity of borrowing
constraints lead to signicant amplication of external shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The stylized facts from the
Japanese economy during 1980 to 2000 are discussed in Section 2. We present
the theoretical model in Section 3 and the quantitative results in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2Alpanda (2006) also uses the same technique.
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2 Stylized facts from Japanese economy
We begin by tracing the uctuations in per capita output in Japan during the pe-
riod 1980 to 2000. The national income accounts data is collected from Hayashi
and Prescott (2002). In our analysis, the population comprises of working age
population i.e. population in the age groups 20 to 69. The average growth rate
of population is .78% and the average growth rate of per capita output is 2.2%
which is slightly higher than the long term average growth rate of per capita
output in United States which stands at 2%.
In Figure 1-a we plot the per capita output detrended at 2.2%. After years of
stable growth during 1980 to 1985, Japanese economy experienced an economic
boom during 1986 to 1991 when output grew at a rate of 1.39% above trend.
However, since 1991 the growth stalls and except for a brief recovery during
1994 to 1996, output continues to decline. During 1991 to 2000 the average
growth rate of per capita output is 1.68% below trend.
In Figure 1-b we plot the capital output ratio that registers a continuous
increase throughout the eighties and the nineties. Capital output ratio increases
from 1.74 in 1980 to 2.36 in 2000 exhibiting signicant capital deepening.
In Figure 1-c we plot the share of non-residential land in total land where
we normalize the total land holdings in the economy to 1. Non-residential
land in our setup comprises of land used for cultivation and land underlying
the non-residential buildings. Residential land is the land underlying residential
buildings. We assume that the sum of non-residential and residential land in the
economy is 1. The data is collected from Japan Statistical Yearbook . The share
on non-residential land increases by .91% during 1986 to 1991 and eventually
falls by 16.7% by 2000.
In Figure 1-d we plot the index of urban land prices as collected from Japan
Statistical Yearbook. In the yearbook, the urban land price index in year 2000
is taken as 100. For our analysis, we take the land price in year 1980 as 100.
During the eighties the average growth rate of urban land prices is 7.6%. The
trend continues till 1991 when land prices start falling. During the nineties
urban land prices fall at an average rate of 4.24%.
3 Theoretical model
We model the Japanese economy as a heterogenous-agent economy model with
two groups of innitely lived agents: entrepreneurs and workers. Entrepreneurs
are of two types: type 1 produces residential services (or housing) and type
2 produces non-residential goods. To keep matters simple, we assume that a
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person is either born as an entrepreneur (either type 1 or type 2) or as a worker
and it is not possible to switch types. We further assume that the fraction
of workers and entrepreneurs of each type remain constant every period. In
addition to the workers and the entrepreneurs, there exists an innite number of
perfectly competitive rms that use the residential services and non-residential
goods as inputs to produce the aggregate consumption good y that is used for
nal consumption and investment. Lastly, there is a government that collects
tax revenue, spends a part of it for government consumption and disburses the
rest as transfers to the economic agents.
Workers are endowed every period with one unit of time. They spend a part
of their time working for the entrepreneurs and the rest of the time is spent
in leisure. There are two sources of income for the worker: wage income and
interest income. After paying labor income taxes and taxes on interest income,
the workers use the rest of their income to buy consumption goods and the
remainder is saved.
The type 1 entrepreneurs begin any period t with certain amount of land
holding. They own the technology to produce residential services denoted by
y1 which is produced using land and labor. For simplicity we do not introduce
capital in production of residential services. The revenue earned from residential
services is used by the entrepreneur to pay wages to the labor and the remainder
is spent on consumption and investment in land. The entrepreneur can also
borrow but they face a borrowing constraint which allows them to borrow only
a fraction of their wealth.
The second group of agents are the entrepreneurs who own the production
process to produce the non-residential goods denoted by y2 . The type 2 en-
trepreneurs begin every period with a certain amount of capital and land..The
entrepreneurs combine capital, land and labor to produce the non-residential
goods, the returns to which are used for consumption and investment in capital
and land. The type 2 entrepreneurs can borrow upto a certain fraction of their
wealth every period.
Both groups of entrepreneurs have to pay corporate income taxes but can
claim the interest paid on borrowed funds as a deductible from their taxable
income. This "tax shelter" creates an incentive for the entrepreneurs to raise
funds through debt nancing as opposed to equity nancing.
We further assume that entrepreneurs do not value leisure. This assumption
is common in literature and has been used by Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and
Minetti (2006) amongst others.
The amount of land in the economy is constant and is normalized to one.
The nal good is treated as the numeraire so that wages, interest rate and prices
are in terms of the nal consumption good.
Let us begin with the economic problem of the representative worker.
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3.1 Workers
The representative workers (denoted by a superscript w) problem is a standard
one. Workers maximize the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility
function given by
E0
P1
t=0 
tuwt (c
w
t ; h
w
t )
where E0 is the expectations operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, cwt
denotes consumption of the workers at time t; and hwt denotes the hours worked
by the workers. The workers maximize the lifetime utility subject to a budget
constraint:
cwt + st+1   st  wthwt (1  ht) + rt(1   st)st + Trwt
where wt is the wage rate and rt is the interest rate on savings in units of
nal consumption good y. The tax on their labor income is ht; and tax on
their interest earnings is denoted by  st. In addition, workers also get transfers
Trwt from the government every period.
Our description of the workers problem is di¤erent from other nancial ac-
celerator models like the ones in Iacoviello(2005), Minetti and Iacoviello (2006)
in that we do not have land in the workersutility function. In earlier studies the
description of the economy was such that the workers valued land for consump-
tion and entrepreneurs value land only as an input. In our model we assume
that the workers as well as the entrepreneurs both value residential services.
The way we model this is by assuming that the nal consumption good y in
the economy that is consumed by workers and entrepreneurs is made up of both
non-residential goods as well as residential services. In addition to the budget
constraint, the workers also face non-negativity constraints every period.
Given the information listed above, we can summarize the representative
workers problem by the following set of rst-order conditions, where twt is
the lagrange multiplier attached to the workersbudget constraint at time t:
We denote the derivative of an utility function uwt (:) with respect to a variable
z with uwzt(:):
cwt : 
tuwct(c
w
t ; h
w
t ) = 
twt (1)
lwt : 
tuwht(c
w
t ; h
w
t ) = 
twt wt(1  ht) (2)
at+1 : 
t+1Et
w
t+1(1 + rt+1(1   st+1)) = twt (3)
wt : c
w
t + st+1   st = wthwt (1  ht) + rt(1   st)st + Trwt (4)
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Combining the equations we get:
uwlt(c
w
t ; h
w
t )  uwct(cwt ; hwt )wt(1  ht) = 0 (5)
Etu
w
ct+1(c
w
t+1; h
w
t+1)(1 + rt+1(1   st+1))  uwct(cwt ; hwt ) = 0 (6)
cwt + st+1   st   wthwt (1  ht)  rt(1   st)st   Trwt = 0 (7)
Equation (5) tells us that in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure of the worker equals the after-tax marginal
product of labor. Equation (6) tells us that in equilibrium, the present dis-
counted value of lifetime utility that would ensue from withholding one unit
of consumption today and saving it instead for consumption in future (after
deducting for the tax on interest income earned) is equal to the marginal disu-
tility that stems today from the lost consumption. Equation (7) is the workers
budget constraint.
3.2 Type 1 Entrepreneurs
The representative type one entrepreneur (denoted by a superscript 1) maxi-
mizes the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility:
E0
P1
t=0 
tu1t (c
1
t )
where E0 is the expectations operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor,
c1tdenotes consumption of the workers at time t. The entrepreneurs maximize
the lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint:
c1t + qt(l
1
t+1   l1t )  (1  yt)(p1ty1t   wth1t   rtb1t ) + b1t+1   b1t + Tr1t
where y1t is the amount of residential services produced at time t and p1t
is the price of residential services in terms of nal consumption good. The
entrepreneurs are assessed a tax on their corporate income at the rate yt: The
entrepreneurs also get transfers Tr1t from the government every period. The
entrepreneurs can claim the interest paid on borrowed funds as a deductible from
the corporate income tax calculation as given by the expression (1 yt)(p1ty1t 
wth
1
t   rtb1t ), where h1t is the demand of workers labor by the representative
entrepreneur: The entrepreneurs also borrow an amount b1t+1  b1t every period.
The after-tax earnings of the entrepreneur are used to nance consumption c1t
and invest in land for the next period (denoted by l1t+1  l1t ). In addition to the
budget constraint, the entrepreneurs also face the collateral constraint:
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b1t+1  B1t+1
B1t+1 = 1t(qtl
1
t+1)
when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined by the net tangible
asset holdings of the entrepreneur and
B1t+1 = Bt+1
when borrowing constraint is exogenous
This collateral constraint is of the ex-ante form and is distinct from the ex-
post borrowing constraint considered in literature where the borrowing limit is
determined as a fraction of the present value of future wealth holdings.
Given the setup of our problem, we can show that the borrowing constraint
holds with equality in the steady state (please nd the proof in Appendix 1).
The entrepreneur also faces a constraint in the form of the production tech-
nology that can be summarized by:
y1t  A1tFt(h1t ; l1t )
where A1t is time varying productivity.
We can summarize the representative type 1 entrepreneurs problem by the
following set of rst-order conditions, where t1t is the lagrange multiplier
attached to the entrepreneurs budget constraint at time t; and t1t denotes
the lagrange multiplier attached to the collateral constraint at time t:We denote
the derivative of an utility function u1t (:) with respect to a variable z with u
1
zt(:)
and the derivative of the production function Ft(:) with respect to a variable
z by Ftz(:): Assuming entrepreneurs face an endogenous borrowing constraint,
the rst order conditions that dene the entrepreneurs problem are:
c1t : 
tu1ct(c
1
t )  t1t = 0 (8)
h1t : 
t(1  yt)1tp1tA1tFht(h1t ; l1t )  t1twt(1  yt) = 0 (9)
l1t+1 :
t+1Etf(1  yt+1)1t+1p1t+1A1t+1Flt+1(h1t+1; l1t+1)
qt+1
1
t+1g   tqt1t + t1t1tqt = 0
(10)
b1t+1 :
  t+1Et1t+1(1 + rt+1(1  yt+1)) + t1t   t1t1t = 0 (11)
Note that when borrowing constraint binds with equality, 1t > 0 and the
set of equations (8) to (11) reduces to:
p1tA1tFht(h
1
t ; l
1
t )  wt = 0 (12)
t+1Etu
1
ct+1(c
1
t+1)f(1  yt+1)(p1t+1A1t+1Flt+1(h1t+1; l1t+1)
 rt+11tqt + (qt+1   qt1t)g   tqtu1ct(c1t )(1  1t) = 0
(13)
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Equation (12) reects the fact that in equilibrium, wage rate is equal to the
after-tax marginal productivity of labor. Equation (13) gives us the equilibrium
condition for investment in land by the entrepreneur, which essentially tells us
that in equilibrium, the present discounted value of lifetime utility obtained by
withholding one unit of consumption and instead investing it in land and deriv-
ing future consumption from it (after deducting the appropriate taxes) is equal
to the loss in utility that ensues today due to consumption withheld. This is a
standard condition except there are two sources of deriving benets from invest-
ment in land: rstly, the entrepreneur gets the benet of increased production
when she uses investment today as an input in the production process tomorrow
(this is reected in the marginal product of land), secondly, the entrepreneur
can use the investment in land as a collateral asset that helps the entrepreneur
in boosting her borrowing capability. This second source of benet that the
entrepreneur derives by additional investment results from the collateral con-
straint being a function of the net worth of the entrepreneur and is unique to
models with endogenous collateral constraints.
3.3 Type 2 Entrepreneurs
The economic problem of the type 2 entrepreneur is very similar to that of type
1.
The representative type two entrepreneur (denoted by a superscript 2) max-
imizes the presented discounted value of a lifetime utility:
E0
P1
t=0 
tu2t (c
2
t )
where E0 is the expectations operator,  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, c2t
denotes consumption of the entrepreneur at time t:
The entrepreneurs maximize the lifetime utility subject to a budget con-
straint:
c2t+qt(l
2
t+1 l2t )+kt+1 kt  (1 yt)(p2ty2t wth2t kt rtb2t )+b2t+1 b2t+Tr2t
where y2t is non-residential good produced at time t and p2t is the price of
the non-residential good in terms of nal consumption good. The entrepreneurs
are assessed a tax on their corporate income at the rate yt: The entrepreneurs
also get transfers Tr2t from the government every period. The entrepreneurs
can claim the depreciated capital and the interest paid on borrowed funds as a
deductible from the corporate income tax calculation as given by the expression
(1  yt)(p2ty2t   wth2t   kt   rtb2t ), where h2t is the demand of workers labor
by the representative type two entrepreneur and  is the depreciation rate: The
entrepreneurs also borrows an amount b2t+1   b2t every period. The after-tax
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earnings of the entrepreneur are used to nance consumption c2t and investment
in land and capital for the next period (denoted by l2t+1   l2t and kt+1   kt
respectively). In addition to the budget constraint, the entrepreneurs also face
the collateral constraint:
b21t+1  B2t+1
B2t+1 = 2t(kt+1 + qtl
2
t+1)
when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined by the net tangible
asset holdings of the entrepreneur and
B2t+1 = Bt+1
when borrowing constraint is exogenous
The proof that the borrowing constraint holds with equality in the steady
state is same as for type one entrepreneur and is summarized in Appendix 1.
The production technology is given by:
y2t  A2tFt(kt; h2t ; l2t )
where A2t is time varying productivity.
We can summarize the representative type 2 entrepreneurs problem by the
following set of rst-order conditions, where t2t is the lagrange multiplier
attached to the entrepreneurs budget constraint at time t; and t2t denotes
the lagrange multiplier attached to the collateral constraint at time t:We denote
the derivative of an utility function u2t (:) with respect to a variable z with u
2
zt(:)
and the derivative of the production function Ft(:) with respect to a variable
z by Ftz(:): Assuming entrepreneurs face an endogenous borrowing constraint,
the rst order conditions that dene the entrepreneursproblem are:
c2t : 
tu2ct(c
2
t )  t2t = 0 (14)
h2t : 
t(1  yt)2tp2tA2tFht(kt; h2t ; l2t )  t12t wt(1  yt) = 0 (15)
l2t+1 :
t+1Etf(1  yt+1)2t+1p2t+1A2t+1Flt+1(kt+1; h2t+1; l2t+1)
+qt+1
2
t+1g   tqt2t + t2t2tqt = 0
(16)
kt+1 :
t+1Etf+(1  yt+1)2t+1p2t+1A2t+1Fkt+1(kt+1; h2t+1; l2t+1)
+2t+1(1  )g   t2t + t2t2t = 0
(17)
b2t+1 :
  t+1Et2t+1(1 + rt+1(1  yt+1)) + t2t   t2t2t = 0 (18)
Note that when borrowing constraint binds with equality, 2t > 0 and the
set of equations (14) to (18) reduces to:
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p2tA2tFht(kt; h
2
t ; l
2
t )  wt = 0 (19)
t+1Etu
2
ct+1(c
2
t+1)f(1  yt+1)(p2t+1A2t+1Flt+1(kt+1; h2t+1; l2t+1)
+ (qt+1   qt2t)  rt+12tqtg   tqtu2ct(c2t )(1  2t) = 0
(20)
t+1Etu
2
ct+1(c
2
t+1)f(1  yt+1)(p2t+1A2t+1Fkt+1(kt+1; h2t+1; l2t+1)
+1  2t   rt+12tg   tu2ct(c2t )(1  2t) = 0
(21)
The equations are similar to the ones described in Equations (12) and (13).
The only additional equation is Equation (21) that gives us the equilibrium
condition for investment in capital by the entrepreneur, which essentially tells
us that in equilibrium, the present discounted value of lifetime utility obtained
by withholding one unit of consumption and instead investing it in capital and
deriving future consumption from it (after deducting the appropriate taxes) is
equal to the loss in utility that ensues today due to consumption withheld.
3.4 Firms producing nal goods
The prot maximizing problem of a representative rm that produces the nal
good y is summarized by:
Max yt  
2X
i=1
pityit
subject to the production constraint:
yt  v(y1t; y2t)
The necessary rst order condition reduces to:
(v1(y1t; y2t)  p1t)1yt = 0 (22)
(v2(y1t; y2t)  p2t)2yt = 0 (23)
where iyt; i 2 (1; 2) is the lagrange multiplier on the production technology
constraint.
3.5 Government and Resource Constraints
The role of the government in my model is a passive one. Government collects
tax revenues and spends it on expenditure and transfers back to the entrepre-
neurs and workers so as to balance the budget every period. Assuming that
Nit; i 2 (1; 2) denotes the number of entrepreneurs of type i and Nwt denotes
12
the total number of workers in period t; the budget constraint of the government
can be summarized as:
Nwt (wth
w
t ht + rt stst) +N1tyt(p1ty1t   wth1t   rtb1t )
+N2tyt(p2ty2t   wth2t   kt   rtb2t )  gt + Tt
where Tt denotes the aggregate transfer. We further assume that the share
of transfers to workers and entrepreneurs in total transfers is xed and is given
by:
NwtTr
w
t = twTt (24)
N1tTr
1
t = t1Tt (25)
N2tTr
2
t = (1  tw   t1)Tt (26)
We close our model by summarizing the resource constraints every period:
Nwtc
w
t +
2X
i=1
Nitc
i
t +N2t+1kt+1   (1  )N2tkt + gt   yt  0 (27)
2X
i=1
Nitb
i
t  Nwtst  0 (28)
2X
i=0
Nith
i
t  Nwthwt  0 (29)
2X
i=0
Nitl
i
t   1  0 (30)
Equation (27) summarizes the goods market clearing condition. Equation
(28) summarizes the loan-market clearing condition and states that borrowings
must be less than or equal to savings every period. Equation (29) is the labor-
market clearing condition that says demand for labor by the entrepreneurs every
period is less than or equal to supply of labor by workers. Equation (30) tells
us that the sum of land held by the entrepreneurs must be less than the total
endowment of land in the economy, which we assume is one unit every period.
3.6 Equilibrium
Given that the utility function of the workers and the entrepreneurs is strictly
quasi-concave and the constraints are linear, the model has a unique equilibrium
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that is characterized by a set of allocation functions summarized by the vector
of allocationsfcwt ; c1t ; c2t ; hwt ; h1t ; h2t ; l1t+1; l2t+1; kt+1; yt; y1t;y2t; b1t+1; b2t+1; st+1;
Trwt ; T r
1
t ; T r
2
t ; Ttg1t=0;and a sequence of prices fwt; rt; qt; p1t; p2tg1t=0 such
that given the state of the economy at any period t summarized by the state
vector, fkt; l1t ; l2t ; bt; stg;and a sequence of exogenous variables summarized
by the vector fA1t; A2t; gt; 1t; 2tg1t=0 the set of allocation functions and the
sequence of price functions satisfy the workers utility maximization problem,
the entrepreneurs utility maximization problem and the nal goods producing
rms prot maximization problem summarized in the previous subsections, the
government budget is balanced every period, and the resource constraints are
satised along with the the relevant transversality conditions.
A balanced growth in this economy occurs when per capita consumption,
outputs, investment in capital, borrowings and transfers grow at a constant
rate (1 + gz) where gz is the long run rate of technical progress and all other
variables remains constant. For our analysis we also assume that the growth
rate of population  is constant and same for all groups.
4 Quantitative Results
In this section, we calibrate our model to match the moments of the Japanese
economy. Next, we solve for the decision rules and feed in exogenous shocks in
our model to account for the observed economic uctuations in Japan during
1980 to 2000
4.1 Model Propositions
We begin with a proposition that establishes the condition for borrowing con-
straints to bind in equilibrium. Note that we can only formally prove the propo-
sition for the steady state.
Proposition 2 In the steady state, the borrowing constraint of the entrepreneur
will hold with equality if and only if the tax charged on the interest earnings of
the workers is less than the corporate income tax rate, i.e.
bt+1 = Bt+1; iff y >  s
bt+1 2 [0; Bt+1]; iff y =  s
bt+1 = 0; iff y < s
14
Proof. We provide a formal proof of the proposition in Appendix 1, but the
idea is a simple one. The entrepreneurs have two ways to nance their invest-
ment: equity-nancing and debt-nancing. Given all other things remain the
same, entrepreneurs will prefer one mode of nancing over the other if there
are some tax advantages attached to one mode. Typically, government allows
entrepreneurs to claim the interest paid on their borrowed funds as a deductible
from their corporate income in calculation of the corporate income tax payment.
Such an option is not allowed for equity-nanced investment, which creates a
bias in favor of debt-nancing. The government, on the other hand, makes up
partly for revenue loss due to this tax-shelter by charging a tax on the interest
earnings of the workers who lend to the entrepreneurs. As we can show in the
proof, the workers can pass on this tax to the entrepreneurs through the market
interest rate which partly depends on the tax on interest earnings. So, essen-
tially the entrepreneurs have to weigh the two taxes: the savings generated by
the ability to deduct interest payments from corporate tax calculations and the
expenses of tax on interest income that is often passed on to the entrepreneurs
through the market interest rate. A rational entrepreneur will therefore favor
debt nancing as long as the savings of the tax shelter scheme outweigh the
cost of having to bear the tax on interest earnings of the lenders. This would
happen if the corporate income tax rate is higher than the tax rate on interest
earnings, which is often the case.
When the two tax rates are equal, the entrepreneur is essentially indi¤erent
between the two modes of nancing, and when the corporate income tax rate is
lower than the tax charged on interest earnings of the lenders, the entrepreneurs
favor equity-nancing. This last option is hard to come by in the real world but
is denitely a theoretical possibility in which case the borrowing constraint does
not hold for the entrepreneur and the model is no longer a relevant one.
Given that the borrowing constraint binds in the steady-state, we assume
that it also binds in the neighborhood of the steady state and apply usual log-
linearization techniques to solve for the decision rules.
4.2 Steady state and Calibration
At this point it is useful to look at the steady state equations that summarize
the model.
For our future analysis we assume the following functional forms of our utility
and production functions:
uwt (c
w
t ; h
w
t ) =

(cwt )
&
(1  hwt )1 &
1 
  1
1   ;  > 1
= & log cwt + (1  &) log (1  lwt );  = 1
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uit(c
i
t) =
ci1 t   1
1   ;  > 1
= log cit;  = 1 where i 2 (1; 2)
A1tFt(h
1
t ; l
1
t ) = A1tl
1l1
t h
1(1 l1)
t
A2tFt(kt; h
1
t ; l
1
t ) = A2tk
k
t l
2l2
t h
2(1 k l2)
t
f(y1t; y2t) = y

1ty
1 
2t
& is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure of the
worker.  is the share of residential services in output. l1 is the share of land
in residential services, k and l2 are the shares of capital and land in the non-
residential goods. For our analysis, we assume that the size of workers and both
types of entrepreneurs is same and we normalize the size to one.
Given the functional forms and the long term growth rate of output and
population, the steady state equations are summarized in Appendix 2:
The objective of the calibration exercise is to estimate the parameters of
our model such that the moments of our model match the moments from data.
We take the moments from Japanese data during the period 1980 to 1984 when
Japan was growing at a steady pace and by many accounts (including Hayashi
and Prescott (2002)) had reached a steady state. The data is from Hayashi and
Prescott (2002) dataset which in turn is collected from Japan Statistical Year-
books and the Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan. The dataset
has become the standard in studies about Japanese economy and has been used
by Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Chen(2006) amongst others. The average
share of investment in output is .25 and the average share of government con-
sumption in output is .14 during this period. The average capital output ratio
is 1.8 which yields a depreciation rate  = :1: The share of housing which we use
as a proxy for residential services in output is .04 which yields  = :04: The data
for taxes is collected from Hiromitshu Ishi(1999). The average labor income tax
rate in Japan h = 33%, the average corporate tax rate y = 49:5% and the tax
rate on return to savings  s = 19%: Note that the corporate income tax rate
in Japan is much higher than the tax rate on interest on savings which makes
borrowing constraint hold with equality in the steady state. For our analysis,
we abstract from any changes in taxes, so taxes in my model are time-invariant.
The data on borrowings is collected from the Japan Statistical Yearbook.
The net borrowings of the consumers for housing purposes is taken as a proxy
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for the share of borrowings of entrepreneur 1 in total borrowing so that b1y = :45:
Given the net borrowings of the non-corporate sector, we take the share of
borrowings in output b2y = 1:75: Note that Alpanda (2006) takes the share of
aggregate borrowing in GDP in Japan to be 2.2 which matches the share of
aggregate borrowing in our model which is the ratio of sum of borrowings of
entrepreneur 1 and 2 to output. The value of residential land (taken as the value
of land underlying residential buildings) as a ratio of output or ql1y = 1:55 and
the sum of the value of land underlying non-residential buildings and cultivated
land is taken as the value of land held by type 2 such that ql2y = 1:08: In
our analysis, we assume that the economy is closed and that all entrepreneurs
face borrowing constraints. In Japan, it is well documented that the small and
the medium rms face borrowings constraints and use their land holdings as a
collateral. As for the bigger rms, we assume that the ability to raise capital
depends on their wealth holdings. This is not a very unrealistic assumption
given the fact that the keiretsu or the rms that had a preferred position in
the Japanese loan markets were bigger rms that had a good network based on
reputation.
Given the value of land and share of borrowings of entrepreneur 1, 1 = :299
and given the capital output ratio, value of land held by entrepreneur 2 and b2y ;
2 = :6143 (a value similar to Alpanda (2006)).
We take the interest rate to be 5% and the rate of relative risk aversion
 = 1:5 that is common in literature. Further, the long term growth rate of per
capita output gz = 2:2% and the long term growth rate of working population
 = :78% which yields  = :99:
Labor h = :33 which yields 1  =  = 1:513: The corresponding measure
for Hayashi and Prescott (2002) is 1.37.
In our model, as opposed to the common symbol in macro literature, k
denotes the share of capital in non-residential output, 1l denotes the share
of land in housing or residential output, 2l denotes the share of land in non-
residential output and h denotes the share of labor in non-residential output.
The calibration exercise yields k = :3198; 1l = :4446; 2l = :0025 and
h = :6777:
Note that given the share of residential output in total output or  = :04;
the share of capital in total output y = (1   )k = :3070;share of residential
land in total output 1l = :0178; share of non-residential land in total output
(1 )  2l = :0024 and the share of labor in total output =   (1  1l)+ (1 
)  h = :6143 which adds up to 1:
The data for transfers is not available by employment or wealth cohorts. We
assume that 80% of the total transfers go to the workers and the remaining goes
to the entrepreneurs. We justify our ndings by the fact that a larger portion
of transfers in developed countries typically go to the workers and medium
businesses as compared to big businesses. Literature on transfer payments by
employment or wealth cohorts in general is limited. Studies on US economy
suggests that about 75% to 90% of social security transfers go to the poorer
households. We check the robustness of our results for alternative share of
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transfers and nd our results are not sensitive to alternative shares. The steady
state values and the calibrated parameters are summarized in Table1 and Table
2.
4.3 Impulse responses
Given the theoretical proposition, borrowing constraint will bind in the steady
state as long as y > s:
We assume that the borrowing constraint binds in the neighborhood of
the steady state and solve for the decision rules using the technique of log-
linearization outlined in Robert King, Charles Plosser and Sergio Rebelo (1988).
The set of log-linearized equations that we solve to derive our decision rules are
summarized in Appendix 2.
We denote the deviations of the variables from their steady state by a tilda
where:
eA1t = logA1t   logA1eA2t = logA2t   logA2e1t = 1t   1e2t = 2t   2egt = log gt   log g
We assume that the deviations in exogenous variables follow a vector au-
toregressive process of order one.
eA1t+1 = a1 eA1t + ea1teA2t+1 = a2 eA2t + ea2te1t+1 = 1e1t + e1te2t+1 = 2e2t + e2tegt+1 = gegt + egt
Given the time series of estimated productivities, the loan to value ratios
and government consumption, we estimate:
a1 = :72; a2 = :78; 1 = :84; 2 = :96 and g = :95:
The vector of standard deviations of the errors :
 =
266664
:04 0 0 0 0
0 :04 0 0 0
0 0 :06 0 0
0 0 0 :09 0
0 0 0 0 :15
377775
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We next plot the impulse response of output, land price, labor and capital
to a 1% positive shock to productivities A1 and A2 and a 1% positive shock to
the loan to value ratios 1 and 2:
4.3.1 Impulse response : Amplication and endogeneity of borrow-
ing constraint
As Figure 2-a depicts, a 1% positive shock to A1 increases output by .065% and
land prices by .005% at impact. The e¤ect is much smaller if we consider an
exogenous borrowing constraint. As depicted in Figure 2-b, a 1% positive shock
to A1 increases output by .055% . However, land prices fall by .038% on impact.
The result is similar when we consider a 1% positive shock to A2: As Figure
3-a depicts output increases by 1.7% and land price increases by .2% on impact
before the e¤ects start diminishing. When we consider borrowing constraint to
be exogenous, output increases by 1.4% and land price decreases by 1.2%. This
is depicted in Figure 3-b.
Given our model parameters as calibrated to the Japanese economy we thus
nd evidence of amplication when borrowing constraint is endogenous.
Apart from A1t and A2t; uctuations in the loan to value ratio 1t and 2t
also a¤ect real macroeconomic variables. In Figures 4-a and 4-b, we plot the
impulse responses of a 1% positive shock to the loan to value ratio Due to a
1% positive shock to 1 output falls by 4.2% and land price falls by 3.8%. At
the same time a 1% positive shock to 2 results in a .8% fall in output and a
.5% decline in land price.
The response to a positive shock to loan to value ratio generates a decline
in labor and output as opposed to an increase. The result follows from the fact
that an increase in the loan to value ratio has a dominant wealth e¤ect on the
workers which results in an increase in consumption of leisure , a normal good.
This results in reduced labor supply that given predetermined capital stock and
land for production, results in a decrease in output.
4.3.2 Impulse response: Sensitivity of amplication to factor shares
One of the main arguments forwarded by Kocherlakota(2000) is that the neo-
classical general equilibrium models with credit constraints lose their power of
amplication as factor shares change. More specically, the decline in share of
capital in output results in a decline in amplication. We test this nding in
our model. We keep the factor share of land the same as before and reduce the
share of capital k to .2 (a measure similar to Kocherlakota(2000)).
Hence the new set of factor shares are : fk = :2; l1 = :4446; l2 =
:0025; h = :8g:
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In Figures 5-a and 5-b, we plot the impulse response of a 1% positive shock
to A1 in a model with endogenous and a model with exogenous borrowing con-
straint respectively. In the former case, output increases by .064% and land price
increases by .002%. In the latter case when borrowing constraint is exogenous,
output increases by .061% and land price registers a fall by .008%.
As for a 1% positive shock to A2; output in a model with endogenous borrow-
ing constraint increases by 1.7% and land price increases by .2%. In comparison,
in a model with exogenous borrowing constraint, output increases by 1.6% and
land price falls by .025% as depicted in Figure 6-a and 6-b.
Hence as compared to the results when k = :3198; reducing k to :2 reduces
the degree of amplication generated by an endogenous borrowing constraint.
One possible explanation of this sensitivity might be that the share of capital
in output comprises a part of the entrepreneurial return. In Kocherlakota(2000),
share of capital was the only entrepreneurial return. In our model, entrepre-
neurial return comprises of share of land and share of capital in output. Fi-
nancial accelerator works through its impact on entrepreneurial net worth and
consequently its impact on business investment. When the return to business
investment in total output is lower we would expect the nancial accelerator
mechanism to lose some of its amplifying power.
This is what we see when we reduce k.
4.4 Application to Japan
The results from plotting impulse responses indicate that a model with en-
dogenous borrowing constraints amplify the impact of external shocks on the
economy.
We next apply the general equilibrium model with endogenous borrowing
constraints discussed above to the Japanese economy during 1980 to 2000. Our
objective is to see to what extent endogeneity of the borrowing constraint ag-
gravated the economic situation in Japan. For our analysis, we concentrate on
uctuations in total factor productivity which by many accounts was one of the
primary reasons behind the boom and bust of the Japanese economy.
For our analysis we assume that A1t = A2t for every t which is the aggre-
gate total factor productivity. The intuition is that production technology for
producing residential services and non-residential goods are both subject to the
same technology shock, which macro literature often refers to as a country-wide
technology shock (as opposed to sector-specic technology shock).
Given the calibrated parameter values and data on capital output ratio,
share of land in non-residential sector, share of land in residential sector and
labor we calculate TFP or the Solow Residual.
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Figure 7 shows the uctuation in detrended productivity over 1980 to 2000.
Total factor productivity continuously grows above the long term growth rate
of 2.2% between 1986 and 1991. In 1991, the growth rate of total factor produc-
tivity starts declining and except for a brief respite during 1994 to 1996, growth
rate of TFP continues to decline till 2000.
We feed in the time series of TFP thus estimated in a model with endogenous
borrowing constraints and compare the results with the case when borrowing
constraint is exogenous.
In Figures 8-a to 8-d, we plot the predictions of feeding in time series of TFP
in our model. We summarize our ndings in Table 3-a and 3-b.
We divide 1980 to 2000 in two sub-periods: the boom years of 1986 to 1991
and the recession years of 1991 to 2000.
The boom years of the Japanese economy are characterized by an 8.4%
increase in per capita output accompanied by a 35.5% increase in land price
between 1986 to 1991. The period also witnessed an increase in non-residential
land holding by .91% and a capital deepening such that capital output ratio
increased from 1.8 in 1986 to 1.9 in 1991.
How well does TFP uctuations account for these facts?
TFP uctuations in a model with endogenous borrowing constraint results
in an increase in output per capita by 5.7% as compared to 4.9% in a model with
exogenous borrowing constraints. Land prices increase by 1.46% in the former
case. However, in the latter case it registers a decline by 1.8%. In case of non-
residential land, we nd that a model with endogenous borrowing constraint
results in an increase by 11.33% while a model with exogenous borrowing con-
straint predicts an increase by 8.65%. With respect to non-residential land hold-
ings, the model predictions are much higher as compared to data. We suspect
that in the real world, land is not very easily tradable as there are zoning laws
and restrictions that prevent residential land from being costlessly converted to
non-residential land. Our model did not have any such restrictions and conse-
quently the shift in land holdings between residential and non-residential use is
much more easy. In this paper for the sake of brevity we abstract from introduc-
ing any zoning laws but it can be easily incorporated in our model by including
an adjustment cost of transfer of land between residential and non-residential
uses with a high adjustment cost reecting steeper zoning laws.
Finally, as far as the capital output ratio is concerned, the ratio increases
from 1.72 to 1.77 when the borrowing constraint is endogenous but remains
constant at 1.78 when the borrowing constraint is exogenous.
Next we look at the recession years which are characterized by a 14.3% drop
in per capita output accompanied by a 48% drop in land prices and a 16.7%
decline in non-residential land. Capital output ratio on the other hand increases
from 1.9 to 2.36.
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In a model with endogenous borrowing constraints, TFP uctuations predict
a 20.8% drop in output accompanied by a 4.8% drop in land prices. Non-
residential land falls by 37.1% and contrary to data, capital output ratio falls
from 1.77 to 1.59. In our model with endogenous borrowing constraints, the
e¤ect of TFP on business investment is greater than the e¤ect of TFP on output.
This explains why we get a decline in capital output ratio in response to a decline
in TFP in contrast to data where there is a capital deepening.
When borrowing constraint is exogenous, output drops by 18.1%. However,
land price increases by 8.89%, a prediction opposite to that of data. Non-
residential land falls by 28.9% while capital deepens such that the capital output
ratio increases from 1.78 to 1.8.
Our results indicate that the impact of uctuations in TFP get amplied
when borrowing constraints are endogenous. Increases in TFP in the presence
of endogenous borrowing constraints resulted in an increased boom of the econ-
omy which would have been much lower had the borrowing constraint been
exogenous. This blessing became a curse during the nineties when endogeneity
aggravated the negative impact of falling TFP. Our model falls short in explain-
ing uctuations in land prices. The magnitude of change in price of land in our
model is much smaller than that witnessed in data and even increasing the per-
sistence of the TFP process does not improve the model predictions with regard
to land prices. This result is consistent with the works of Nakajima(2003) who
nds that a model with rational expectations cannot account for uctuations in
real estate prices in Japan.
In our model, TFP uctuations alone have not been able to generate signi-
cant uctuations in land prices. We do have rational expectations in our model.
That begs the question: is uctuations in land price in Japan really a bubble
phenomenon which cannot be explained by economic fundamentals (in our case
productivity shocks)? Or is it sensitive to expectations specications and if we
had adaptive expectations instead of rational expectations framework, we would
have better results?
This analysis is outside the scope of this paper and we leave it for the future.
5 Conclusion
A wide spectrum of theoretical studies suggest that in the presence of endoge-
nous borrowing constraints small shocks can have a much amplied and persis-
tent impact on the economy. The mechanism is a simple one: exogenous shocks
lead to changes in the borrowers net worth. Given endogenous borrowing con-
straint, uctuations in a borrowers net worth translates to reduced funds for
business investment which magnies the impact of a small shock. The popular
name of this mechanism is : nancial accelerator.
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However quantitative studies have posed quite a challenge for the nan-
cial accelerator mechanism. Kocherlakota (2000) showed that the amplication
might be quite small and is very sensitive to factor shares.
That leaves us with a question: quantitatively how important is the nancial
accelerator mechanism? The question has assumed particular signicance in the
aftermath of the Japanese and the East Asian crisis which were characterized
by signicant uctuations in the real estate and asset prices along with uc-
tuations in real economic aggregates. Given the nancial environment where
debt nancing is a common way of raising funds for investment and rms often
borrow against a collateral, the two phenomenon might be intrinsically linked.
We expect external shocks to cause uctuations in real estate and asset prices
which would then get transmitted to the real economy resulting in amplied
uctuations of output.
In this paper, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing
constraints to quantitatively test the importance of the nancial accelerator
mechanism. We allow entrepreneurs to borrow funds for investment. However
there is an upper limit on the amount the entrepreneurs can borrow that is
determined by the net worth of the entrepreneurs. Calibrating our model to
the Japanese economy we nd that the magnitude of uctuations in real estate
prices and per capita output in response to a shock to total factor productivity
is much more amplied when borrowing constraint is endogenously determined
by the borrowersnet worth as opposed to an exogenously determined cap.
We do nd that the degree of amplication is sensitive to factor shares. We
tested a case where the share of capital in output was reduced as compared to
our benchmark case. We nd that the degree of amplication goes down in the
former case as compared to the latter.
Next, we applied our model to Japan. Our objective was to see to what
extent endogeneity of borrowing constraint was instrumental in magnifying the
boom and the bust of the Japanese economy during 1986 to 2000. We nd that
our model with endogeneity registers greater increase and decline in output per
capita in response to TFP uctuations as compared to a model where borrowing
constraints are exogenous. However, the model falls short of explaining the
land price uctuations of the same magnitude as witnessed in data, though
endogeneity does amplify the impact of TFP on land prices. This suggests the
possibility of a bubble which renders land price not so dependent on economic
fundamentals, or it opens up the possibility of a need to modify the model, with
one possible modication being in the structure of expectations as suggested by
Nakajima (2003).
One assumption in our model was that all entrepreneurs are subject to a
binding borrowing constraint. An area for future research might be to relax this
assumption and test a case where only a fraction of the entrepreneurs at any
time face binding borrowing constraint. It would be interesting to see to what
extent the e¤ect of the external shock would get amplied in such a case. We
suspect the e¤ect to be smaller than what we nd and we also suspect the e¤ect
would be sensitive to the degree of interaction between the constrained and the
unconstrained entrepreneur. For example, if the output of the credit constrained
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entrepreneur is an important input used by the unconstrained entrepreneur,
we might expect the e¤ect of TFP shocks to be bigger. A detailed general
equilibrium model in this area would help us nd answers.
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Table 1: Moments from Japanese data (average 1980 to 1984)
Data moments Model moments Steady state values(1980 to 1984)
Interest rate r 5%
Capital output ratio ky 1:8
Residential land to output ratio ql1y 1:55
Non-residential land to output ratio ql2y 1:08
Residential borrowing to output ratio b1y :45
Nonresidential borrowing to output ratio b2y 1:75
Labor l :33
Per capita output growth rate gz 2:2%
Working population growth rate  :78%
Labor income tax rate h 33%
Tax rate on interest earnings  s 19%
Corporate income tax rate y 49:5%
Table 2: Calibrated value of parameters
Parameter Description Values
 Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 1:513
 Rate of time preference :99
 Depreciation rate :1
(1  )k Share of capital in nal output :3070
1l Share of residential land in nal output :0178
(1  )2l Share of non-residential land in nal output :0024
h(1  ) + (1  1l) Share of labor in nal output :6728
 Share of housing in total output 4%
1 Loan to value ratio of entrepreneur 1 :299
2 Loan to value ratio of entrepreneur 2 :6143
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Stylized Facts from the Japanese Economy (1980-2000)
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Figure 1-a: Per capita output with respect to the long tern trend
Capital output ratio
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Figure 1-b: Capital output ratio
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Stylized Facts from the Japanese Economy (1980-2000)
Share of non-residential land in total land
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Figure 1-c: Share of non-residential land in total land
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Figure 1-d: Land price with respect to the long term trend
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Impulse response to a 1% shock to A1(k = :32; l1 = :45; l2 = :0025; h = :68;  = :04)
a1 = :72
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Figure 2-a: Endogenous borrowing constraint
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Figure 2-b: Exogenous borrowing constraint
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Impulse response to a 1% shock to A2(k = :32; l1 = :45; l2 = :0025; h = :68;  = :04)
a1 = :78
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Figure 3-a : Endogenous borrowing constraint
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Figure 3-b : Exogenous borrowing constraint
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Impulse response to 1% shock to loan-to-value ratio
(k = :32; l1 = :45; l2 = :0025; h = :68;  = :04)
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Figure 4-a : 1% positive response to 1(1 = :84)
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Figure 4-b: 1% positive shock to 2(2 = :96)
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Impulse response to a 1% shock to A1(k = :2; l1 = :45; l2 = :0025; h = :8;  = :04)
a1 = :72
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Figure 5-a: Endogenous borrowing constraint
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Figure 5-b: Exogenous borrowing constraint
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Impulse response to a 1% shock to A2(k = :2; l1 = :45; l2 = :0025; h = :8;  = :04)
a2 = :78
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Figure 6-a: Endogenous borrowing constraint
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Figure 6-b: Exogenous borrowing constraint
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Application to Japan
Evolution of total factor productivity in Japan during 1980 to 2000
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Figure 7: Total Factor Productivity (Solow Residual)
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Impact of TFP uctuations under alternative borrowing constraints
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Figure 8-a: Per capita output (a1 = :72; a2 = :78)
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Figure 8-b:Capital output ratio (a1 = :72; a2 = :78)
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Impact of TFP uctuations under alternative borrowing constraints
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Figure 8-c: Non-residential land (a1 = :72; a2 = :78)
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Figure 8-d: Land price (a1 = :72; a2 = :78)
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Model Performance : Exogenous vs. Endogenous borrowing constraint
Table 3-a: Pre-crisis years (1986:1991)
Borrowing constraint
Data Endogenous Exogenous
Output per capita (% change) 8.4% 5.7% 4.9%
Land price(% change) 35.5% 1.46% -1.8%
Share of non-residential land (%change) .91% 11.3% 8.65%
Capital output ratio(level-1986 to 1991) 1.8 to 1.9 1.72 to 1.77 1.78 to 1.78
Table 3-b: Crisis years (1991:2000)
Borrowing constraint
Data Endogenous Exogenous
Output per capita (% change) -14.3% -20.8% -18.1%
Land price(% change) -48% -4.8% 8.89%
Share of non-residential land (%change) -16.7% -37.1% -28.9%
Capital output ratio(level-1986 to 1991) 1.9 to 2.36 1.77 to 1.59 1.78 to 1.8
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
The rst order condition of the worker with respect to savings st+1 can be
summarized by:
at+1 : 
t+1Et
w
t+1(1 + rt+1(1   st+1) = twt (31)
Allowing for long term trend in output and population the equation reduces
to:
at+1 :

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t+1
Et
w
t+1(1 + rt+1(1   st+1)) (32)
=

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t
 (1 + gz)
w
t (33)
In the steady state, the equation reduces to:
(1 + r(1   s)) = (1 + gz)


(34)
The rst order condition of the entrepreneur i with respect to borrowings
bit+1 can be summarized by:  t+1Etit+1(1 + rt+1(1  yt+1) + tit   titit = 0 (35)
Allowing for long term trend in output and population the equation reduces
to:
0@  (1 + gz)1  ()t+1Etit+1(1 + rt+1(1  yt+1))
+ (1 + gz)

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t
it   it

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t
1Ait = 0
(36)
Note that if borrowing constraint binds with equality then it > 0 which
implies that
0@  (1 + gz)1  ()t+1Etit+1(1 + rt+1(1  yt+1))
+ (1 + gz)

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t
it   it

(1 + gz)
1 
()
t
1A = 0 (37)
In the steady-state the equation reduces to:
 (1 + r(1  y)) + (1 + gz)


  i
 (1 + gz)
1  = 0 (38)
) (1 + gz)


  (1 + r(1  y)) = i
 (1 + gz)
1  (39)
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Substituting for (1+gz)

 from Equation : we get
(1 + r(1   s))  (1 + r(1  y)) = i
 (1 + gz)
1  (40)
) r(y    s) = i
 (1 + gz)
1  (41)
Hence the su¢ cient condition for i > 0 is that (y    s) > 0 or y >  s:
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Appendix 2: Technical Appendix
The set of steady state equations of the model is summarized by:
1  &
&
  w
cw
(1  h)(1  hw) = 0 (42)
  p1y1
y
= 0 (43)
1    p2y2
y
= 0 (44)
   (1 + gz)

1 + (1   s)r = 0 (45)
   x
k
  1 + (1 + gz) = 0 (46)
k(1  ) 

1  2
1  y

(1 + gz)


  1

+  + 2r

k
y
= 0 (47)
1l 
"
1  1
1  y
 
(1 + gz)
 1

!
  1
1  y +
1
(1 + )(1  y) +
1r
(1 + )
#
ql1
y
= 0 (48)
2l(1  ) 
"
1  2
1  y
 
(1 + gz)
 1

!
  1
1  y +
2
(1 + )(1  y) +
2r
(1 + )
#
ql2
y
= 0 (49)
w   (1  l1) y
h1
= 0 (50)
w   (1  )(1  k   l2) y
h2
= 0 (51)
b1
y
  1
ql1
y(1 + )
= 0 (52)
b2
y
  2

k
y
+
ql1
y(1 + )

= 0 (53)
y1  A1ll11 h1 l11 = 0 (54)
y2  A2kk ll12 h1 l12 = 0 (55)
y   y1 y1 2 = 0 (56)
l1 + l2   1 = 0 (57)
b1 + b2   s = 0 (58)
cw + (1 + )s  s  whw(1  h)  r(1   s)s  Trw = 0 (59)
c1   (1  y)(p1y1   wh1   rb1)  (1 + )b1 + b1   Tr1 = 0 (60)
cw + c1 + c2 + (1 + )k   (1  )k + g   y = 0 (61)
whwh + r ss+ y(p1y1   wh1   rb1) + y(p2y2   wh2   k   rb2)  g   T = 0 (62)
Trw   twT = 0 (63)
Tr1   t1T = 0 (64)
Tr2   (1  tw   t1)T = 0 (65)
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Note that a variable in the steady state is denoted without a time subscript.
We have 24 unknowns summarized by the vector of allocations
fcw; c1; c2; hw; h1; h2; l1; l2; k; y; y1;y2; b1; b2; s;Trw; T r1; T r2; Tg;and a vector
of prices
fw; r; q; p1; p2g1t=0 and 24 equations,.so we can solve for the steady state
model variables uniquely.
Next we summarize the log-linearized form of our rst order conditions.
Using the terminology of King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) we get two sets
of equations: deterministic equations and expectations equations.
Any variable with a tilda denotes the log-deviation of the variable from its
steady state except for ert = rt   r
The set of deterministic equations can be summarized by:
ewt + ecwt +  (1  ) hw1  hw ehwt = 0 (66)eyt   ecwt   11  hw ehwt = 0 (67)
cw
y ecwt +  (1 + gz) syest+1   [1 + r  (1   s)] syest   (1   s) syert
  (1  h) [(1  )  (1  k   l2) +   (1  l1)] eyt   twy eTt = 0 (68)ec1t + 1

e1t = 0 (69)
c1
y ec1t    (1 + gz) b1y eb1t+1 + [1 + r  (1  y)] b1y eb1t + (1  y) b1y ert
  (1  y)    l1eyt   t1y eTt + ql1y el1t+1   ql1y el1t = 0 (70)ec2t + 1

e2t = 0 (71)
cw
y
ecwt + c1y ec1t + c2y ec2t +  (1 + gz) ky ekt+1   (1  ) ky ekt + gyegt   eyt = 0 (72)
g
y
egt   h  [(1  )  (1  k   l2) +   (1  l1)] eyt   ( s   y) s
y
ert   ( s   y) s
y
est = 0 (73)
eyt    eA1t   (1  ) eA2t     l1  el1t     (1  l1)  eh1t
  (1  ) kekt   (1  ) 2lel2t   (1  )  (1  k   l2)  eh2t = 0 (74)eh1t   eh2t = 0 (75)
h1eh1t + h2eh2t   hehwt = 0 (76)
The set of expectational equations are summarized by:
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(1 + gz)


ewt+1 + (1   s) ert+1   (1 + gz) ewt = 0 (77)
b1
y
eb1t+1   ql1y(1+gz)e1t   1ql1y(1+gz) eqt
+ 1ql1y(1+gz)
el1t+1 = 0 (78)
b2
y
eb2t+1   2ky ekt+1   k+y ql2y(1+gz) e2t
  2ql2y(1+gz) eqt + 2ql2y(1+gz)el2t+1 = 0 (79)
l1el1t+1 + l2el2t+1 = 0 (80)
b1
y
eb1t+1 + b2
y
eb2t+1   s
y
est+1 = 0 (81)
(1+gz)

 (1  2) e2t+1 + k (1  ) (1  y) ykEt eyt+1   ekt+1
  (1  y)2ert+1   1 + r (1  y)  (1+gz)  e2t
  (1+gz) (1  2) e2t = 0
(82)
(1+gz)
 1
 (1  1) e1t+1 + 1l (1  y) yql1Et eyt+1   el1t+1  (1  y) 1(1+gz)ert+1
 eqt 1 + (1  y) l1 yql1   1(1+gz) + r(1 y)(1+gz)   (1+gz) 1  e1t
  (1+gz) 1 (1  1) e1t = 0
(83)
(1+gz)
 1
 (1  2) e2t+1 + 2l(1  ) (1  y) yql2Et eyt+1   el2t+1  (1  y) 2(1+gz)ert+1
 eqt 1 + (1  y) l2(1  ) yql2   1(1+gz) + r(1 y)(1+gz)   (1+gz) 1  e2t
  (1+gz) 1 (1  1) e2t = 0
(84)
Given the set of deterministic equations, and the set of expectational equa-
tions, the set of unknowns is summarized by the vector:
fewt ;ecwt ;ehwt ; eyt; eTt;ec1t;ec2t; e1t; e2t;eh1t;eh2t;ekt+1; est+1;eb1t+1;eb2t+1;el1t+1;el2t+1; ert; eqtg:
We have a set of 19 equations and 19 unknowns so we can uniquely determine
the decision rules of the model.
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